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Abstract 
 
In this paper we shall propose a credit card 
transaction fraud detection framework which 
uses Hidden Markov Models, a well 
established technology that has not as yet 
been tested in this area and through which 
we aim to address the limitations posed by 
currently used technologies.  Hidden Markov 
Models have for many years been effectively 
implemented in other similar areas.  The 
flexibility offered by these models together 
with the similarity in concepts between 
Automatic Speech Recognition and credit 
card fraud detection has instigated the idea 
of testing the usefulness of these models in 
our area of research.  
 
The study performed in this project 
investigated the utilisation of Hidden 
Markov Models by means of proposing a 
number of different frameworks, which 
frameworks are supported through the use of 
clustering and profiling mechanisms.  The 
profiling mechanisms are used in order to 
build Hidden Markov Models which are more 
specialised and thus are deployed on training 
data that is specific to a set of cardholders 
which have similar spending behaviours.  
Clustering techniques were used in order to 
establish the association between different 
classes of transactions.  Two different 
clustering algorithms were tested in order to 
determine the most effective one.  Also, 
different Hidden Markov Models were built 
using different criteria for test data.   
 
The positive results achieved portray the 
effectiveness of these models in classifying 
fraudulent and legitimate transactions 
through a resultant percentage value which 
indicates the prominence of the transaction 
being contained in the respective model. 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The use of plastic money, particularly credit 
cards, is becoming increasingly popular.  It has in 
fact become a critical component in the ever 
increasing world of electronic commerce.     
 
The success of each means of payment is 
determined by the opportunities it provides as 
against the risks posed.  Credit cards, although 
they have proved to be successful and are a 
popular instrument for effecting payments, still 
pose risks particularly in the area of e-commerce 
whereby online transactions are effected.   
 
Online transactions are better known as 
Cardholder Not Present (CNP) transactions in the 
financial world.  The name itself is an indication 
of the added risk posed by such transactions since 
no physical verification can be performed.  Only 
electronic details are being transferred from the 
person effecting the payment to the merchant, 
which details normally include the card number 
and expiry date as well as the cardholder’s 
personal details such as the name, surname and 
address.  Trust is an essential element in this 
regard however, as with all areas that provides 
leeway for malicious financial gain, there are 
risks and makes it a target to fraudsters.  As can 
be seen, the details used for effecting online 
transactions can very easily be stolen by 
fraudsters.  Given that these details do not offer 
any form of verification they can be easily used in 
order to effect CNP fraudulent transactions.  
According to APACS, the UK Payments 
Association [11], CNP fraudulent transactions are 
the most common form of fraud amongst the 
different types which include lost and stolen cards 
as well as counterfeit cards.  In fact, CNP fraud in 
the UK during 2005 amounted to £183.2 million, 
a substantial 41.7% of the total plastic card fraud 
incurred during the same year.  A significant 
improvement was the reduction in total plastic 
card fraud during 2005, which amounted to 
£439.4 million, a decrease of 12.9% over the total 
plastic card fraud incurred during 2004, which 
figure stood at £504.8 million.  However, contrary 
to the general scenario, CNP fraud has showed a 
further increase of 21.5% during 2005 as 
compared to 2004, highlighting the urgency for 
fraud prevention and detection in this area. 
 
Our aim in this project is to formulate the 
structure of a credit card fraud detection system 
which works at transaction authorisation level, 
i.e. a real-time system which tries to prevent 
fraudulent transaction from being effected.  
Amongst the main challenges posed by such a 
system is the ability to take fast and valid 
decisions since time and accuracy are critical 
elements in such an environment. 
2.0 Framework Architecture 
 
We shall hereunder present the proposed 
framework of a real-time credit card fraud 
detection system whose engine is driven through 
the use of Hidden Markov Models.  This engine 
however, needs to be supported by a complete 
framework and we shall thus propose the 
complete idea whereby we make use of a 
collection of technologies, merging them together 
in order to provide a thorough structure.   
 
The diagram below gives a high level idea of how 
these concepts will be merged during the 
deployment of the proposed system in three main 
steps.  Step 1 is a representation of the profiling 
performed on all credit card holders based on 
their spending behaviour.  Step 2 represents the 
process of grouping the data of each profile on a 
chosen criteria and performing clustering on each 
group of transactions.  The clusters generated for 
each group are ultimately used in order to 
represent the hidden states of each HMM and in 
connection with the computed vectors and 
matrices and the symbol set we will compute an 
HMM for each group of transaction patterns.
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: System Methodolgoy 
 Source: T Chetcuti 
 
Once patterns of past transactions have been 
managed effectively, the system shall then make 
use of these same patterns in order to analyse 
and perform fraud detection on each incoming 
transaction authorisation.  This mechanism will 
enable us to perform fraud detection at 
transaction authorisation level.  This gives us 
the capability, in the case that the authorisation 
request is suspicious, of performing 
authorisation scoring and consequently 
appropriate actions can be taken accordingly.  
Actions taken might include declining the 
authorisation request. 
 
Transaction Data   
 
The message format of a credit card 
authorisation request is based on the 
international standard ISO 8583 [10].  This 
standard defines the different attributes that a 
transaction authorisation may contain.  At this 
stage we shall base our analysis on the following 
six attributes, which attributes are deemed as 
effective enough in order to monitor the nature of 
each transaction: 
 
- Transaction Type: identifies the type of 
transaction being effected, i.e. whether it is a 
purchase, a cash withdrawal, a refund etc.; 
- Business Class: identifies the type of 
business from which the transaction has 
originated.  Codes used by this field are 
system defined; 
- Merchant Country: identifies the country 
whereby the merchant is established; 
- Capture Method: identifies the means by 
which the transaction was captured for 
instance ATM, POS or an electronic-
commerce transaction; 
- Transaction Amount: represents the amount 
in monetary value for which the transaction 
was effected; 
- Transaction Currency: indicates the currency 
in which the transaction was effected. 
 
Using this choice of fields in order to represent a 
single transaction, we will then use a sequence of 
these transactions per cardholder, known as the 
time window, for the deployment of our models.  
At this point we have chosen our transaction 
sequence to be made up of five consecutive 
transactions.   
2.1 Profiling 
Profiling is a significantly powerful technology 
since it has the ability of processing large 
amounts of data, such as historical transactions 
of cardholders, and deducing from them a 
smaller set of significant elements.  For instance, 
if we had to compare each cardholder with the 
other cardholders it will be very time consuming 
to match two or more cardholders which have 
similar spending history.  However, with the use 
of Peer Group Analysis we will be able to group 
together those cardholders which more or less 
have the same spending history and therefore we 
can compare the behaviour of each one to the 
behaviour of the other cardholders that are 
grouped under the same profile.   
 
We will define the different profiles and assign 
the appropriate profile to each cardholder.  From 
this point onwards cardholders’ profiles will be 
updated with every new incoming authorisation 
request.  
3.0 Hidden Markov Models 
 
Hidden Markov Models shall be used in order to 
extract transaction patterns from past 
transactions and subsequently compare an 
incoming authorisation request, and the latest 
effected transactions of the same cardholder, 
with the sets of extracted patterns.  The 
comparison will generate a percentage value 
which represents the probability of the analysed 
pattern being contained in that particular model.   
 
Based on the profiling mechanism applied 
previously we propose that independent HMMs 
are devised for each profile.  Such an 
implementation will increase the effectiveness of 
HMMs since spending patterns that are popular 
in one profile may not be popular in another 
profile and therefore the HMMs built will be 
specific for each group of cardholders. 
3.1 Clustering 
In order to manage better transactions that are 
not identical however similar in nature it is 
deemed important to make use of an 
unsupervised clustering technique.  This 
technique will aid in capturing similar 
transactions into a common cluster. The derived 
clusters will subsequently be used to represent 
each of the hidden states of the HMM.  In this 
section we shall give a detailed description of the 
proposed clustering mechanism.   
 
Hidden States 
 
Due to the fact that clustering engines are 
already widely deployed, it is deemed 
appropriate to reuse already developed engines.  
In fact, the clustering process within our 
prototype has been based on the Waikato 
Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) 
Package.  It was decided that two separate 
prototypes shall be developed, each using a 
different machine learning algorithms, i.e. the 
partitioning algorithms SimpleKMeans and EM 
(Expectation-Maximization).  Ólafsson [14] 
states that partitioning algorithms are deemed 
to be appropriate in particular when having 
large data sets. 
The SimpleKMeans requires the user to enter 
the number of clusters required to be constructed 
for each data set.  The best results are normally 
achieved through analysing the data and hence, 
as suggested by Mobasher [13], performing a 
series of tests based on different number of 
clusters.  With each test performed the 
SimpleKMeans will generate the mean vectors, 
also known as the centroids, of each cluster 
together with the percentage value representing 
the number of instances assigned with each 
cluster.   
 
On the other hand, the EM algorithm is capable 
of deriving the appropriate number of clusters 
based on the test data utilised, through the use 
of cross-validation.  This might prove to be 
particularly useful in our case since depending 
on the training set we are using a different 
number of clusters might be required.  The main 
idea behind the EM algorithm is to firstly 
calculate the cluster probabilities in terms of 
mean and standard deviation with regards to 
numeric attributes and value counts with 
regards to nominal attributes. Subsequently the 
algorithm will calculate the distribution 
parameters.   
 
An important feature of both clustering 
algorithms is their ability to handle both 
numeric as well as nominal attributes, which 
attributes are assumed to be independent of each 
other.  Secondly these algorithms have the 
capability of automatically normalising numeric 
attributes. 
 
The fact that through the use of the 
SimpleKMeans and the EM algorithms each 
instance is associated to just one cluster allows 
us to use the clusters as our models’ hidden 
states and hence compute the necessary 
probability values in order to have a complete 
model.   
3.2 HMM Implementation 
In this section we shall analyse what other 
components need to be formulated and how these 
will be integrated with each other, together with 
the hidden states obtained in the previous 
section, in order to be able to construct the 
HMMs. 
 
Observation States 
 
The set of observations states, also known as the 
symbol set, refers to those states that can be 
viewed by the naked eye.   
 
For the scope of this project this set is taken to 
be the set of different transactions present in our 
test data set.  Each distinct transaction, based on 
our choice of attributes, is considered to be a 
different element of the symbol set.   
 
Initial Probability Vector  
 
The initial probability vector will include a 
probability value for each of the clusters present 
in the model.  Each value represents the 
possibility of having a transaction associated 
with that cluster at the start of the transaction 
pattern, i.e. at time t = 1. 
 
These values are derived by means of keeping a 
count of how many of the first transactions 
within each pattern are associated with each 
cluster.  Once the counts are in hand each cluster 
is assigned the initial probability value by means 
of computing the proportion between the 
respective count and the total count for all 
clusters. 
 
State Transition Probability Vector  
 
When processing the clustering logic it is 
necessary that we keep a track of the 
associations between each transaction and its 
respective cluster.  This will help us, amongst 
other things, in computing the state transition 
probabilities.  The latter is derived by means of 
keeping a count of how many transactions 
associated to a particular cluster are followed by 
transactions from each of the other clusters as 
well as transactions from the same cluster.  Once 
we have these counts, i.e. the count of how many 
transactions associated to cluster a are followed 
by transactions associated with clusters a, b, c … 
n, we may sum up the total counts per cluster 
and subsequently compute the proportion of each 
count to the total.  This same procedure is to be 
applied to each cluster.  The derived values will 
constitute the state transition probability vector.     
 
Observation Probability Matrix  
 
Previously we discussed the process of capturing 
the symbol set for each HMM.  It is important 
that whilst capturing each distinct symbol we 
also keep track of its popularity within the whole 
data set.  This count is required for computing 
the observation probability matrix, which matrix 
signifies the probability value of each symbol 
entering each hidden state, i.e. cluster.   
 
In addition to the symbol count, this computation 
requires a track of the association between the 
symbols and the clusters, which association is 
already being used for computing the state 
transition probability vector.  Once we possess 
both the count for each symbol and the 
associations between the symbols and the 
clusters we can compute the probability of each 
symbol entering each of the clusters.  This is 
computed by summing up the total counts for the 
symbols associated with a particular cluster and 
then deriving the proportion of each count with 
respect to the total counts of the cluster in 
question.  All remaining symbols not associated 
with this same cluster will obtain an observation 
probability of 0%.     
4.0 Evaluation 
 
The prototypes discussed in section 3 have been 
deployed and various tests have been performed 
using each prototype in different data scenarios.  
The intention of the tests performed was to 
determine whether the expected behaviour can 
be actually achieved and also to determine which 
of the prototypes generates the most efficient 
results. 
 
Data Pre-processing 
 
All of the chosen attributes accept for transaction 
amount were of categorical data types, which 
categories have been defined by the provider of 
the data.  After analysing the categories defined 
for each attribute it was decided that the choices 
available for field business class were too specific 
and could therefore be mapped onto a list of more 
generic categories.   
4.1 Test Cases 
The first set of test cases shall contain the 
following: 
- Build an HMM using the SimpleKMeans for 
fraudulent patterns; 
- Build an HMM using the SimpleKMeans for 
non-fraudulent patterns; 
- Build an HMM using the EM for fraudulent 
patterns; 
- Build an HMM using the EM for non-
fraudulent patterns. 
 
On the other hand, the second set of test cases 
shall be further split according to the business 
classes.  In order to determine which business 
cases are to be considered amongst the whole set 
of business classes a statistical analysis was 
performed.  Given that the source of our data is 
not a specialist on fraud detection labelled 
fraudulent transactions were not very popular 
and therefore through this analysis we aim at 
using the largest data sets.  It was found that 
fraudulent transactions effected at merchants 
having business class Transport (4000) are the 
most popular, at 17.84%.  Next in line were the 
business classes Financial/Banking (6000) at 
10.06% and Department Stores (5300) at 7.01%.   
4.2 Test Results 
Each test performed has been tested on both the 
Fraudulent Training Set as well as the 
Legitimate Training Set, whereby a percentage 
indicating the possibility of the test pattern 
being contained in the respective training set is 
deduced.  This result is subsequently compared 
to the expected categorisation of the test data.  
Furthermore, each test performed has been 
performed on two different prototypes, one of 
which uses the SimpleKMeans clustering 
algorithm and the other uses the Expectation 
Maximization clustering algorithm. 
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SKM 12 0.324% 14 0.003% F F 
1 
EM 3 0.529% 6 0.001% F F 
SKM 12 4.688% 14 0.006% F F 
2 
EM 3 2.768% 6 0.002% F F 
SKM 12 0% 14 0% F N 
3 
EM 3 0% 6 0% F N 
SKM 12 0.003% 14 0% F F 
4 
EM 3 0% 6 0% F N 
SKM 12 0% 14 0% F N 
5 
EM 3 0% 6 0% F N 
SKM 12 5.513% 14 0% F F 
6 
EM 3 0.071% 6 0% F F 
SKM 12 0% 14 0% L N 
7 
EM 3 0% 6 0% L N 
SKM 12 0% 14 0% L N 
8 
EM 3 0% 6 0% L N 
SKM 12 0% 14 0% L N 
9 
EM 3 0% 6 0% L N 
SKM 12 0% 14 0.001% L L 
10 
EM 3 0% 6 0% L N 
SKM 12 0% 14 0.437% L L 
11 
EM 3 0% 6 0.001% L L 
SKM 12 0% 14 0.016% L L 
12 
EM 3 0% 6 0.013% L L 
SKM = SimpleKMeans 
EM = Expectation Maximization 
F = Fraud, L = Legitimate, N= None 
 
Table 1: Test Results Fraud/Non-Fraud Models 
Source: T Chetcuti 
 
Table 1 above depicts the results obtained for the 
first set of test cases.  The most prominent 
characteristic is that test cases 3 and 5 have not 
generated any percentage values whatsoever.  
This is in itself a result.  Although we expected 
the models to categorize the test cases to Fraud, 
a result of 0% in each model indicates that the 
pattern being tested is not prominent in any of 
the models.  In actual fact the pattern under test 
is contained in the training data of the fraud 
model however it is not a popular pattern when 
compared to the other patterns.  These results 
show us an important feature of HMMs, the 
capability of not only determining the 
classification of a pattern but better still assign a 
probability based on the likelihood of that 
pattern occurring.   
 
An interesting result is that generated by test 
case 4 on the fraud training set whereby we can 
observe that the prototype utilising the 
SimpleKMeans algorithm has managed to detect 
the pattern under test whereas the prototype 
utilising the EM algorithm failed to do so.  The 
fact that SimpleKMeans generates higher 
percentage values can in actual fact be observed 
in all test cases which generated a result larger 
than 0% but one.  The fact that the model using 
SimpleKMeans does not always generate a 
higher percentage value is a positive outcome 
since this indicates that the SimpleKMeans 
algorithm is sensitive to some characteristics 
which we are yet to identify.  In fact, upon 
analysing both the data used as well as the 
clusters constructed by each clustering algorithm 
we can conclude that the difference in the results 
is mainly due to the fact that the SimpleKMeans 
algorithm, which uses 12 clusters in this test 
case, is more accurate since it can determine 
more accurate transition probabilities between 
the clusters.  On the other hand, the EM 
algorithm makes use of 3 clusters and therefore 
the transition probabilities between the three 
clusters are less realistic.   
 
The latter analysis also holds for those cases 
whereby the SimpleKMeans generated higher 
percentage values such as test case 1 (for 
legitimate training data), test case 2 and test 
case 6 (for fraud training data).  In these cases 
we can conclude that the SimpleKMeans is more 
specific and thus more realistic in its results.   
 
Analysing the last 6 test cases depicted in table 
1, all of which make use of test data that is a 
legitimate transaction pattern, we can observe 
similar behaviour to the previous 6 test cases.  In 
this case we can observe that there are 3 test 
cases, i.e. test cases 7, 8 and 9, which generate a 
percentage value of 0% in both training data 
sets.  Due to the fact that the set of data for 
legitimate patterns is much larger in size, since 
fraudulent transactions constitute a small 
percentage of total transactions, we only used a 
small random sample.  However, this random 
sample is representative of the total sample since 
it can be observed that in both cases the variety 
of transaction patterns is vast.  This variety 
makes it harder to generate a percentage value 
larger than 0% since the popularity of a 
transaction pattern in a vast data set is less 
significant.   
 
Test case 10, when performed on the legitimate 
training data set, shows similar behaviour to test 
case 4 when generated on the fraud training data 
set.  As can be observed in this case the 
prototype based on the SimpleKMeans algorithm 
is capable of generating a classification whereas 
the prototype based on the EM algorithm is not.   
 
Test cases 11 and 12 both managed to generate a 
correct classification result irrespective of the 
prototype being used. 
 
Based on the results illustrated in table 1 above, 
the following charts show an aggregate view of 
the effectiveness of both algorithms.  As can be 
observed the SimpleKMeans algorithm shows a 
better success rate over EM.  
 
SimpleKMeans
Correct 
Classification
58%
No 
Classification
42%
Incorrect 
Classification
0%
EM
Correct 
Classification
42%
No 
Classification
58%
Incorrect 
Classification
0%
 
Figure 2: Classification Capability based on first set of 
test cases 
Source: T Chetcuti 
 
Similar to the charts displayed in figure 2, figure 
3 overleaf gives a pictorial analysis of the 
effectiveness of building models based on the 
second suggested grouping criteria, i.e. based on 
building an independent model for each group of 
patterns having the last transaction pertaining 
to the same merchant business class. 
 
The charts displayed in figure 3 depict a 
comparison between the effectiveness of the two 
clustering algorithms in terms of the models 
deployed for the second grouping suggestion.  
The comparison gives a clear indication that the 
SimpleKMeans provides more effective results 
when compared to the results of the models 
using the EM algorithm. 
 
SimpleKMeans
Correct 
Classification
59%
No 
Classification
33%
Incorrect 
Classification
8%
EM
Correct 
Classification
50%
No 
Classification
42%
Incorrect 
Classification
8%
 
 
Figure 3: Classification Capability based on second set 
of test cases 
Source: T Chetcuti 
5.0 Conclusion and future work 
 
Through the analysis performed on each of the 
tests described in section 4 it was observed that 
in general the results obtained were quite 
optimistic and thus promote the potential use of 
HMMs in the area of credit card transaction 
fraud detection.  Most importantly this analysis 
highlighted the capability of HMMs in 
determining not only the classification of a 
pattern but better still assign a probability based 
on the likelihood of that pattern occurring. 
 
With regards to the two grouping criteria 
suggested for building models one can analyse, 
through the use of the charts in figures 2 and 3, 
that although the two modelling concepts had 
more or less the same classification success rate 
when comparing the use of the SimpleKMeans 
algorithm there was a higher success rate for the 
second grouping criteria when using the EM 
algorithm.  With regards to the incorrect 
classification performed through the use of the 
second grouping criteria we shall consider this as 
acceptable at this stage.  Although the expected 
classification was different than the generated 
classification, the percentage values obtained 
indicate that although the pattern is in actual 
fact present in the fraud data set it is more 
prominent in the legitimate data set.  A higher 
percentage value in the legitimate training data 
set signifies a higher risk in declining the 
transaction authorisation request since there is a 
bigger probability that the transaction is 
legitimate rather than fraudulent.  Considering 
all of these issues it is therefore suggested that 
the second grouping criteria may be more 
effective, particularly when making use of the 
profiling mechanism.   
 
From an efficiency perspective we can only 
indicate that whilst performing each of the test 
cases documented, models based on the EM 
clustering algorithm took much longer to build.  
In worst case scenario the EM algorithm took 10 
times as much to complete than models using the 
same training and test data sets but based on 
the SimpleKMeans algorithm. 
 
Based on all of the discussed aspects and the 
evaluation results obtained it is believed that the 
SimpleKMeans algorithm might potentially be 
more effective as well as efficient.  A correct 
classification of 59% is a very positive result 
considering that the data we are using is only a 
sample of the real data and that the profiling 
mechanism has not been implemented.  It is 
believed that by implementing the profiling 
mechanisms, which will help in building models 
that are more specific and specialised, the 
classification success rate is increased 
drastically.  Furthermore, we should keep in 
mind that the 8% of misclassification is also a 
positive result.  Despite not obtaining the 
expected result the actual result is a true 
representation of the prominence of the 
transaction pattern in the chosen samples of 
data.  Such situations indicate that the risk of 
declining the respective transaction 
authorisation is higher since there is a high 
probability that the same transaction is a 
legitimate transaction.  It is also believed that 
the profiling mechanism will reduce drastically 
the 33% non-classification results since specific 
models will help in capturing data better. 
 
Future Work 
 
The ideas proposed in this project can be further 
enhanced particularly through further in-depth 
analysis in order to determine the most effective 
clustering algorithms to be used, apart from the 
K-Means or the Expectation Maximization 
algorithms.  Furthermore, one can also use the 
structure and concepts proposed in this project in 
order to broaden the scope of the system.  For 
instance, one can analyse how the same ideas 
can be applied to the merchants as well as to the 
cardholders.  Another alternative would be 
analysing the application of the same structures 
with respect to credit card application fraud 
detection rather than credit card transactions.   
 
Finally we suggest that a full implementation of 
the proposed framework is performed, which 
implementation will allow us to test the complete 
concepts in particular the idea of profiling users 
and thus having more specific Hidden Markov 
Models.  Further thorough investigation can also 
be performed on implementing an effective 
scoring mechanism to the proposed framework.  
This will be capable of giving meaning to the 
results achieved through the use of Hidden 
Markov Models. 
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